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Historical Tidbits, the Shoah, and the Teaching of Mathematics
Wolff-Michael Roth1
University of Victoria, Canada
Abstract
In this extended essay, I use cultural-historical activity theory to look at the questions Theodore
Eisenberg raises about the inclusion of historical facts, both historical tidbits and ethically
questionable tendencies and horrific actions (the Shoah), in the teaching of mathematics. I
conclude by suggesting that the ultimate answer has to be one that involves a decision, which
means that an answer cannot be provided a priori or be determined by any antecedent. Deciding to
include this or that in a mathematical curriculum is an ethical act.
Pardonner le pardonnable, le véniel, l’excusable, ce qu’on peut toujours
pardonner, ce n’est pas pardonner. [To forgive the forgivable, the venial, the
excusable, that which one can always forgive, is not forgiving at all.] (Derrida,
2005, p. 32)
In his article “Flaws and Idiosyncrasies in Mathematicians: Food for the Classroom,” Theodore
Eisenberg raises an interesting issue: Should mathematics teaching merely focus on mathematical
concepts or should mathematics students (at school and university levels) also know about the
lives of the mathematicians who first articulated a theorem or solution, the cultural context
within which some mathematicians have worked (Nazism, Russian dictatorship), etc.? Some of
the examples he features are those of Einstein wearing shoes without socks—I never wear socks,
and always sandals rather than shoes, even during visits to central Canadian cities in the winter—
and Alan Turing, often considered to be the father of computer science, being homosexual.
Eisenberg raises other issues that are more serious, concerning, for example, the appropriation
and appreciation of the products of labor by anti-Semitic scholars and artists. He has not
addressed another situation, that of anti-Semitic philosophers or philosophers who did not
declare opposition to the Nazi regime, such as Martin Heidegger. For me, therefore, there are
two levels of questions. First, should we use and enjoy the productions of these people—
Heidegger’s philosophy, Wagner’s music, the findings and productions by Nazi scientists and
mathematics? Some individuals do not appear to mind, as we can see from the fact that the novel
Seven Years in Tibet, written by the Heinrich Harrer, a member of Hitler’s elite SS, recently was
turned into a film for a second time. Here, producers, participants in the making of the film, and
audiences willingly contribute to the perpetuation of a part of Harrer’s autobiography. More so,
the author’s subsequent autobiography Beyond Seven Years in Tibet, My Life Before, During and After
has been released in 2006.
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What should we do about the findings of psychological studies that clearly would no longer pass
any human research ethics board? One such study was conducted by Stanley Milgram. In this
study, ordinary people began to “punish” other ordinary people with electrical shocks of
increasing intensity—and despite increasing expressions of pain—obeyed the experimentalist to
punish their non-compliant victims even harder. Many of the participating subjects left the
experiment traumatized because they had found themselves committing horrendous violence—
they did not know that their “victims” were actually faked—similar to the once committed by
Nazi torturers. Nowadays, Milgram’s study probably would not pass the human research ethics
requirements on “minimal risk,” such as those that the Canadian National Council on Ethics in
Human Research, representing the Tricouncil (which units the three councils funding research in
(a) social sciences and humanities [SSHRC], (b) science and engineering [NSERC], and (c) health
research [CIHR]), adheres to. And excuses such as “I was simply following orders” no longer will
cut muster.
And what should we do about the studies Nazi doctors did on hypothermia using concentration
camp interns from Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Dachau leading to the death of many “research
participants” (really, subjects subjected to atrocities)?
And how does the idea of forgiveness play in here?
Eisenberg’s paper raises many questions and, fortunately, the author is not subject to the hubris
of offering simple answers to these difficult questions. In science education, there is an ongoing
debate about the usefulness of teaching not just science content but the nature of science, which
means, providing students with opportunities to learn about how science is practiced—including
its contingent nature that the science studies literature reported over the past three decades.
Surely, what we do in everyday life generally, and how we understand ourselves specifically,
mediates what we do professionally. My own activities of intensely gardening (supplying yearround all vegetables we need), cooking (I do the cooking at home), building (I finish the
basement, lay tiles and hardwood floors, etc.) have given me an appreciation of the role of the
body in knowing; and I have exploited this understanding in the theories of knowing, learning,
and meaning with respect to mathematics in the lives of professional scientists. Thus, for
example, over 50 percent of research biologists could not interpret a graph that appeared in a
first-year university textbook of their own field. Yet some did provide successful interpretations,
and these drew on their everyday experiences—for example, going hiking in the local mountains
or fertilizing plants and vegetables in their gardens—as resources in their interpretations.
To get a better handle on these issues and questions, I use cultural-historical activity theory,
because it makes me look at the systems within which such things as mathematical theorems,
technological artifacts (atomic bomb, rockets), scientific knowledge, philosophical masterpieces,
musical oeuvres, or paintings and sculptures are produced and reproduced. In the following, I
outline the theory and then use it to look at the issues that Eisenberg raises in his article.
A Cultural-historical Activity Theoretic Perspective
The Historical Roots of Cultural-Historical Activity Theory
Cultural-historical activity theory was founded by Russian psychologists (e.g., Leont’ev, 1978)
discontent with the way in which most Western psychologist reduced human activity to the
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intentions and actions of individuals, on the one hand (as apparent in the famous Vygotsky–
Piaget debate), or to the determination of human agency by environmental factors, on the other
(behaviorism). They proposed, instead, to use entire activities as the unit of analyzing human
productions; here, an activity is denoted by a verb such as farming, manufacturing tools, tailoring,
hunting/fishing, doing university-based research, and so forth. Different activity systems together
allow societies to survive, as the needs of individual human beings are satisfied through the
exchange of resources to meet fundamental needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter. Thus, it
would be unthinkable today to have a mathematician living like Diogenes in a barrel without
doing something in exchange for which he or she would receive food, clothing to live in
Canadian climates, and a heated home.
Activity Theory in Its Present-Day Form
Activity theory later was taken up in the West, where, in one of its two main versions
(Engeström, 1987), the structural aspects are highlighted in a mediational triangle (Figure 1).
Before explaining the figure in its details, I must highlight three important points. First, the
triangle has to be thought as consisting of two mutually constitutive layers, one describing the
material world, the other describing how the material world is reflected in human consciousness.
Thus, as Alexei N. Leont’ev frequently is quoted to have said/written, the object exists twice—
once materially, once in the consciousness that reflects the material world. Second, the triangle
only represents the structural aspects of human activities only, pushing the agency required to
mobilize structure into the background. Thus, while looking at Figure 1, readers need to keep in
mind that it represents the structure of activity, but that it really requires agency to mobilize the
resources available in this structure. Third, the triangle constitutes a static representation pushing
the historical aspect of the theory into the background. Thus, as its name suggests, culturalhistorical activity theory emphasizes the historically and culturally contingent aspects of human
consciousness. Therefore, what is possible today in terms of mathematical proofs particularly and
mathematical praxis more generally would not have been thinkable 50 or 100 years ago, or, to
sharpen this issue, it would not have been possible yesterday. To understand activity systems,
such as the one producing new mathematical knowledge, we therefore always need to study
mathematical culture in its historical dimensions. The question Eisenberg raises about teaching
some of the contingent elements in mathematicians’ lives can be answered in the affirmative, for
anything that happens in an activity system leaves its mark on the activity system, including, for
example, its outcomes (mathematical knowledge) and its subjects (mathematicians as persons).

Figure 1. The structure of cultural-historical activity theory contains 6 main moments that cannot be
reduced to each other. Activity as a whole, therefore, is the unit of analysis.
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Cultural-historical activity theorists take activity as the minimal unit of analysis. Thus, the triangle
in Figure 1 as a whole needs to be considered when we want to know how, for example, new
mathematical theorems are produced. Because activity is the minimal unit, none of the terms in
the figure denotes an “element” (as some researchers falsely do, even those who self-declare to
be practicing cultural-historical activity theory). Rather, these terms denote moments, that is, parts
that can be articulated on heuristic grounds but cannot be thought independent from other
isolable parts because all of those aspects mutually constitute each other (Roth & Lee, 2007).
Philosophically inclined readers may think of the term singular plural, where the whole constitutes
the parts and the parts constitute the whole; mathematically inclined individuals know analogous
phenomena in systems of coupled differential equations for dynamical systems that cannot be
separated in which the current value of certain variables appear as parameters in the evolution of
other variables. This then makes it immediately clear that from the chosen theoretical perspective,
we cannot think of mathematical theorem production in terms of a mathematician’s mental
structure and content.
In activity, three levels of events need to be distinguished yet at the same time understood in their
mutually constitutive nature: activity, action, and operations (Leont’ev, 1978). An activity—
consistent with its origin in the German concept Tätigkeit and the Russian concept
deyatel’nost’—refers to a form of event at the societal level that contributes to sustaining the life
form. Thus, farming, teaching, producing tools, fishing and the likes are activities—doing a
mathematical problem in high school is a task. Activities are interconnected, exchange people,
products, and money and in so doing, contribute to meet human needs. Activities therefore are
oriented toward object-constituted motives. More so, activities contribute to the sense of actions
(Figure 2), which concretely realize activities. Actions are oriented toward the goals individual and
collective subjects set themselves to transform the relevant object into an outcome (product).
These last three sentences point us to the dialectical relationship between activities and actions
(Roth, 2007a). Actions realize activities, but activities provide the sense for an action: the same
action is associated with a different sense in a different activity (showing the middle finger to a
teacher who requests silence is different to showing the middle finger when a team mate requests
receiving the ball). Actions and the goals they pursue are realized by operations, which are not
conscious but determined by the context—we walk to the fridge to get some ice, but the walking
itself is realized by steps that we do not think about. But operations are produced only in the
service of realizing goal-driven actions. There therefore is another dialectical relationship between
conscious, goal-directed actions and contextually determined operations, each presupposing the
other. Here, goal-directed actions serve as a referent in the unconscious “selection” of operations.
Together, the two dialectical relationships between activity and actions, on the one hand, and
actions and operations, on the other hand, denote a process that I term meaning. As actions may
become routinized, they turn into operations; operations also may be “copied” unconsciously
while someone participates with others in research or daily activities (by means of a process that
has come to be termed mimesis). In this way, operations really constitute crystallized forms of
cultural practices (i.e., patterned actions).
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Figure 2. An activity, although it constitutes the unit of analysis should be analyzed in terms of
three levels that stand in dialectical (mutually constitutive) relations.
Emotions, as I recently showed in an analysis of mathematics in the workplace (Roth, 2007b), are
central to events at the conscious and unconscious levels. At the selection of goals, human beings
will select those that have a higher valence, that is, that promise some sort of pay-off associated
with satisfaction (higher salary, well being). Mathematicians do research and write papers because
of the positive emotional valence that comes with innovation and achievement, because
publication leads to pay raises, or because of some other reason associated with some pay-off. At
the unconscious level, our current emotional states (feeling down, elated) are part of the contexts
that shape the production of operations. We know that there are days that we do not feel like
doing research or where we do not feel like writing, and no external force driving us will improve
the results.
In the following, I use a recently paper published in a journal of applied mathematics (Lü,
O’Regan, & Agarwal, 2007) as an exemplary case to explain Figure 1, though not having followed
them around with my camera, I am not in a position to write about the emotional aspects in the
way I have done it for fish culturists (Roth, 2007b).
An Exemplary Case of an Activity System in Applied Mathematics
The three authors of the paper “Existence to singular boundary value problems with sign
changing nonlinearities using an approximation method approach” set out to produce two
theorems concerning singular boundary value problems, theorems that—in the words of the
authors—constitute the original contribution of the work. In terms of the theory, the three
authors constitute the subject, the singular boundary value problems the object, and the theorems
the intended outcome of the activity. What they do is mediated by the tools they have available,
which may have been some form of electronic means to communicate between their institutions
located in China, Ireland, and Australia, respectively. That we cannot reduce the different
moments also is immediately evident, as the object of activity (boundary value problems) and the
outcomes (theorems) define the nature of the subject, applied mathematicians, but the nature of
the subject as mathematicians defines the object. To return to the analogy with the coupled
differential equations, the temporal evolution of the object and the temporal evolution of the
subject cannot be thought (modeled) independently because the state of one at a point in time
enters the evolution equation of the other. More so, in a world where difference is required for
thinking, the object defines the very nature of the subject. Thus, we would not find everyday folk
doing singular boundary value problems: Solving such problems makes sense within the
community of mathematicians and within activity systems of mathematics; it does not make
(immediate) sense in other communities, where this might be considered something outlandish
(think about what Einstein’s coworkers in the patent office might have thought about him if they
knew he was working on what came to be known as relativity theory). Also, we cannot
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understand what has been produced without the means of production, which mediate between
subject and object. Thus, mathematical activity has a mediated nature.
There are further mediations at work to understand the actions of the mathematicians. For
example, the division of labor that the three authors have chosen mediates the relation between the
subject and object—the “flavor” of the solution proposed may depend on who does what and
who takes the lead. The community of applied mathematicians also mediates the relationship
between subject and object, as it will be the recipient and “consumer” of the outcomes of this
activity. Therefore, what constitutes a legitimate object of mathematical activity and who
constitutes a legitimate mathematician depends on (is mediated by) the community of
mathematicians. This also is immediately evident when we think of the first people to read a
manuscript: editors and reviewers. The manuscript has to address the concerns of these recipients
(“consumers” [Figure 1]) to make it into a scientific journal in the first place. Thus, the three
mathematicians do not just develop theorems and proofs, but they do so in a way that they
presuppose others to recognize as legitimately mathematical. More so, much of what
mathematicians do does not require conscious reflection: Few scholars I have met know, in terms
of formal rules, how to write a good paper: they know to write a paper in the same way they
know how to walk or in the way children speak grammatically correct without knowing formal
grammar. That is, much of what mathematicians do happens at the level of operations, which
may have been the result of explicit actions that have crystallized or that they may have
appropriated by unconsciously emulating others within the culture. The Chinese funding agency
NNSF, acknowledged in the first footnote, also mediated the object, as its grant enabled the
pursuit of the solution and the production of the theorems. Finally, there are rules that mediate
between the mathematicians and their object. Thus, for example, to solve the singular boundary
value problem requires a particular procedure, the proposal of the theorem and its proof,
including the production of lemmas and corollaries that are required to achieve the outcome in the
concrete way that it present itself to readers (“consumers”) of the article.
Consequences of Activity Theory for Thinking about Tidbits
Two main points need to be made here. First, if human activity is mediated then all moments of
activity make their mark on the outcome, including the means of production, the particulars of
the (individual, collective) subject, and the community. For example, the arrival of computers on
the scene in the 1960s allowed new forms of doing mathematics to emerge, even though
mathematical purists do not accept the use of computers as legitimate. More so, what is
acceptable mathematics is a function of the current state of the mathematical culture, which is a
characteristic of the mathematical community of the day. But so was the theory of the delta
function that the physicist Paul Dirac introduced, but which formal mathematicians did not
initially accept as a legitimate object of inquiry until a rigorous definition of distributions as
functionals was produced a few years later (Balakrishnan, 2003). In a strong sense, therefore,
particulars of the individual and collective subject make their mark on the outcomes. Simple,
mundane, and everyday experiences may therefore mediate the solution to scientific problems.
For example, one story about the discovery of the chemical structure of benzene suggests that
Friedrich August Kekulé had a daydream of a snake biting its tail. Other versions of the discovery
say that he might have seen a dance with multiple couples joining up in a ring. (The 2005 Nobel
Prize in Chemistry was given “for the development of the metathesis method in organic
synthesis,” a process explained in terms of a “ring dance with partner exchange” between alkene
and catalyst pairs.) Quite innocuous events, images, and observations may provide solutions to
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important scientific and mathematical findings, for which individuals are credited, though they
received rather then intended the insight provoked by their being part of everyday collective and
material life.
Now if we were flies on the wall watching mathematicians at work, then to understand what is
happening, mathematicians’ actions, we would need to look at the activity system as a whole. (I
am aware of at least two studies that looked at mathematical activity in real time: Livingston
[1987] videotaped the reproduction of Gödel’s theorem by two mathematicians, and Mertz and
Knorr-Cetina [1997] studied theoretical physicists working out some aspect of string theory, that
is, the BRST cohomology of the W-algebra.) We cannot just be concerned with presupposed
contents of the mathematicians’ minds, but we have to take into account the means they use, the
community that they intend the products of their labor for, the (tacit/implicit and explicit) rules
they adhere to, the division of labor they enact, and so forth.
Implications of an Activity-Theoretic Perspective
Cultural-historical activity theory allows us to better appreciate the relationship between
individual and collective. The individual but realizes a possibility that exists at the collective level.
The simultaneous emergence of the verb “to google” in the Anglo-Saxon world is but an
example of this fact. Another example is that of language emergence: At the very instance that a
(first) human being articulated a first word or phrase, he or she had to presuppose that the
listener already understood, and therefore, the first speaker was not the first linguistically
competent individual after all given that the recipient of the message (listener) had to be equally
competent.
From cultural-historical activity theory we can learn two main things pertinent to the issues that
Eisenberg raises. First, the outcomes of activity bear the marks of every single moment that one
can identify in the system as a whole. Second, and arising from the first, there are strongly viewed
no individual contributions, because individual achievements are the outcomes of historical
reconstructions where the system as a whole has been abstracted and made to disappear. Thus,
the shoemaker or factory worker producing Einstein’s shoes, the tailor who cut and sewed his
suit, the farmer producing the wheat for his bread, the architect and construction worker making
his home all have been abstracted, though Einstein could not have lived his life without them.
Third, cultural-historical activity theory teaches us that we produce and reproduce society at a
point in time that is culturally and historically contingent. Had Einstein lived 50 years before, he
likely would not have been in the position and would not have had the resources to produce
general or specific relativity theory (for which he has become most well known), his paper on the
photoelectric effect (for which he received the Nobel Prize), or any of the other contributions
that he now is celebrated for. More so, 50 years later, he would not have been in the position to
invent these theories, as someone else would have likely invented them because the time was ripe
and the resources available for framing and solving these problems. This is so because at the
collective cultural level, there are action possibilities; at the time of Einstein, a reformulation of a
number of issues in physics could be undertaken. Sooner or later someone else would have
realized these possibilities.
Now, we cannot know whether wearing or not wearing socks has contributed in any way to the
production of relativity theory or any other of the contribution. But it might have been the case
that not wearing socks—like taking walks in ice-cold creek water that the Bavarian priest and
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hydro-therapist Sebastian Kneipp recommended (Einstein went to school in Munich, the capital
of Bavaria)—contributed to a sufficiently healthy condition that allowed him to do the work he
did. In this case, if he had been a sickly person, the association between relativity theory or
photoelectric effect and Albert Einstein might not have come about. In phenomenology, it is
accepted that our bodies constitute what we can know (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Henry, 2003).
Knowing means knowing to act, not in a reflective way, but in the same way that we know how
to walk upright without thinking, in the same way that we talk to our neighbors on the street
without having to think about what to say, in the same way we teach mathematics and statistics
lectures without having to stop and search for words. This form of knowing leads to the
production, in real time, of behaviors that are marked by contingencies: we stumble or stutter
during a lecture, we produce incongruencies and malapropisms, we bend the nail rather then
getting it into the wood or wall, and so forth. And from such contingencies derive images that
produce solutions to the hard problems that exist in the science and mathematics. Take the
following examples.
Einstein used the image of an elevator to consider issues concerning relativity. Now this required
his knowledge of elevators, and perhaps he had ridden elevators over and over again, such as I
had done when I was a child in the hotels near the campground where my family staid during its
summer vacations. From a phenomenological perspective, this is entirely intelligible: his
experience has changed his way of understanding, and this understanding, intuitive and
inarticulate as it may have been, became a resource in his thinking about relativity theory as
Kekulé’s image of the snake biting its tail, an age-old image existing at the cultural level for a long
time, mediated his solution to the benzene structure. Saying that Einstein was fond of riding
elevators might be considered a tidbit, but without this experience and the tidbit it gave rise to (if
this were to be the case), he would not have been able to think through these issues at all. Does
such a tidbit warrant inclusion in the teaching of physics or mathematics of general relativity: yes
and no. On a historical level, Einstein may not have been able to produce the principles of
general relativity, but someone else might have produced it. On an epistemological level, it would
help us understand that experience is required for anything like conceptual knowledge—a main
point in praxis theories and phenomenological theories of knowing. We do not need to know
about his habit—if this were in fact the case—of riding elevators, because someone else would
have stated the principles of relativity because they constituted a general possibility. And if
someone else had produced them slightly before or after, its statements would be connected to
different personal experiences.
Some contingencies and quirks easily can be abstracted from the scientific and mathematical
productions; or viewed differently, the marks these contingencies and quirks on the outcomes of
scientific and mathematical activity can be considered minor or invisible so that we may disattend
to them. Einstein’s quirky habit of wearing shoes without socks may be among those. But in the
case of Sir Isaac Newton, we have some outcomes of his activities that became contributions to
mathematics and physics, leading to celebrations of his outstanding qualities and “genius.” But
other productions were so much marked by his twisted, tortured, and mystical nature that they
did not make it into the annals and history of standard science (White, 1999). This biographer
also notes Newton’s homosexual tendencies, his ability to hold grudges for decades, and his
egomaniac and very petty nature. Thus, Newton’s contributions to alchemy and his productions
concerning Old Testament prophecies—he thought that the design of Solomon’s temple was a
code for the entirety of recorded human history—did not become acceptable contributions to
any official science and therefore do not feature in today’s science (together with his laws) or
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mathematics textbooks (together with his calculus). That is, to understand Newton’s production,
we need to understand all these tidbits. To understand Newton as a person, we do need to know
about his phantasms, his alchemy, and so forth. These tidbits allow us to understand that
Newton was just another person, with all its idiosyncrasies. But to understand the law of gravity,
we do not need to know these tidbits. And further, it is not Newton alone who is responsible for
the law of gravity or the law relating force and acceleration now bearing his name: F = ma or the
calculus in the form he proposed. The scientific community has taken care that the quirks are
irrelevant and only those productions come to be recognized as contributions to science that are
without the contingencies and particularities that characterized Newton’s other productions.
Anti-Semitism
The same will be the case concerning the other main issue that Eisenberg brings forth: Should we
accept the productions of anti-Semitic scholars and artists? The answer is not easy and my
inclination is to say that the answer and solution must be inherently contradictory to allow us
making the choice. If the answer were inherently possible and straightforward, it would not
require a choosing and taking a stand, and therefore could be delivered in a mechanical and
mechanistic way. It would not take a human being to implement, but could be programmed into
a computer, which would produce the pre-determined and pre-programmed solution.
Should we accept the productions made within a society that has anti-Semitic tendencies or made
by individuals who also make anti-Semitic statements? That is, should we reject the mathematical
and scientific advances made during the Nazi regime, including scientists and mathematicians
with declared or undeclared Nazi tendencies or sympathies? History shows that—for pragmatic
reasons—such tendencies and sympathies often are neglected and even forgotten. (See also my
introductory example of the Heinrich Harrer book and film.) Rockets were developed during the
Third Reich, and so was the knowledge and the technology for the atomic bomb, both
subsequently further developed in the USA and the USSR, including the collaboration of
emigrated and captured German scientists. Is a rocket or an atomic bomb anti-Semitic? It
probably is not. Is an atomic bomb anti-Japanese or anti-Nazi? Well, it has been used by the
Americans who, like Canadians, interned their citizens of Japanese origins despite their allegiance
to the new home country. And it has been used to kill “innocent” Japanese in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, who, as in Germany, may not have adhered to the public ideology but have remained
silent for fear of being interned and killed in concentration camps. Are scientists responsible?
Most scientists will respond “no,” conferring the responsibility for the bomb to politicians.
Others will not be so sure and will want to make scientists ethically responsible for their
production.
Should we not read the work of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger because of his
allegiances with the Nazi regime? Some readers may not want to read him for this reason. Others
may claim that his work, such as Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) does not bear evident marks of
these tendencies and therefore, like the atomic bomb, can be considered as a philosophical
achievement acceptable to be discussed in scholarly circles. Do we reject Jean-Paul Sartre because
he showed sympathies for the repressive regime of the USSR? Do we reject the productions of
those U.S. scholars and artists that were devout Marxists and Soviet friendly (and for that
persecuted by McCarthy)? Or should we reject those who assisted McCarthy in the persecution
of his fellow citizens? Should we reject the productions by present day Israeli scholars because
they live in, and perhaps support, a political system that causes havoc for Palestinian families who
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have nothing to do with the attacks of militants and suicide bombers? Should we reject the
scientific and mathematical findings of U.S. citizens because they live in a country that has the
death penalty, that, in the eyes of many people around the world engages in unethical and
inhuman interrogation, internment, and repression practices (Abu Graib; Guantanamo Bay;
100,000 civilian “collateral damage” in Iraq as a by-product of “fighting global terrorism”)? The
US is, after all, one of the countries that Amnesty International cites for human right violations
of the kind that individuals from other nations are tried for in the world court at The Hague. This
list of questions shows that there are no easy solutions; in fact, any solution may be the possible
impossible itself. Personally, it is somewhere along these lines that I would like to place myself
for pragmatic purposes. It would force me to make a decision in each and every case, in each and
every course I teach, always requiring me to think about the unsolvable mystery of (collective)
human consciousness that leads us to these aporetic situations.
Coda: Should We Teach the Tidbits of History?
In the manner of Jacques Derrida, one of my most favorite philosopher, who avoids giving
simple answers to complex problems, I make another turn: Though announcing the end (Coda!),
I make another beginning. It is a truly Nietzschean (eternal) beginning and renewal. Therefore I
make another return concerning the question whether we should be teaching about Einstein’s
socks: In another area of my research, gesture studies, it is well known that some hand-arm
movements are coincidental, that is, without function in the conversation; these are referred to as
“grooming” movements, such as scratching one’s arm during a conversation. Other hand-arm
movements do have a function because they contribute to understanding on the part of the
speaker or listener: for example, when the listener scratches her head, the speaker may take this
to be an indication that the listener does not understand or has difficulties understanding. How
are human beings capable to separate scratching one’s from signaling lack of understanding?
Pragmatically, we do separate the two forms of hand-arm movements; and if there were a
misinterpretation to occur, subsequent speaker- or listener-initiated transactional turns would
seek to rectify misalignment. How do we separate the wheat from the chaff, and is the chaff of
relevance?
In mathematics (science) education, does it matter for a student to know whether Einstein wore
socks or not? On the one hand, it does not matter teaching about it: wearing socks and the
outcome of Einstein’s thinking processes, e.g., general relativity theory, appear to be unrelated.
On the other hand, it does matter: we are less prone to deify, as this often happens, a human
being who, after all, is subject to birth, death, and (eating, drinking, defecation, clothing) needs as
all other human beings. The emperor has no clothes; and Einstein had no socks when he slipped
into his shoes without them. Einstein was special, as we all are; and he was not so special, as we
all are. He realized cultural possibilities; as we all do. And he realized some in a way that he
became celebrated for; as some of us are when we receive awards for work attributed to us (I
have a few of those). But these rewards are from communities that have enabled and accepted
the very innovations that we produce—in giving me an award a society actually rewards itself, for
I would not have published if the community had not been ready for it. Einstein built on the
knowledge produced by others before him, including Albert Michelson and Edward Morley’s
experiments on the constancy of the speed of light; he knew of the Fitzgerald-Lorentz
contraction, and he knew of the transformations that convert the observation of measurements
in different systems of reference, which were named by the French mathematician Henri
Poincaré after the Dutch physicist and mathematician Hendrik Lorentz (the Lorentz
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transformations). Knowing about Einstein’s habit to wear shoes without socks is but one piece of
evidence to recognize that the emperor does not wear clothes.
My answer to the question whether we should teach historical and biographical tidbits has to
remain contradictory: I personally like to live in a world where we the emperor has no clothes if
this is the case. In my work with graduate students and colleagues, I always make this point clear
whenever someone asks me about my scholarly productivity or produces some other laudatory
comment, for example, about the number of prizes and awards I have received. I always
comment that all these accomplishments would have been impossible without the community
that was the very source of the possibilities that I concretely realized, but which someone else
could have realized as well. So sometimes I point out that I, too, do not wear clothes, experience
pain, suffer, am elated, and so forth.
The question whether we should teach the tidbits of mathematics and science history depends on
how we see ourselves. The answer therefore has to remain aporetic, forcing us to make choices
rather than accepting present conditions that dictate to us whether to include tidbits and the
Shoah in mathematics (science) teaching. Are we like dog trainers, getting the best to perform
whatever we teach? Or are we educators interested in more than the mechanical transmission of
knowledge and skills? Should high school students know about the context within which
mathematical knowledge was produced? Definitely so! Does this mean knowing about the
presence or absence of socks on Einstein’s feet? Perhaps. Should university mathematics students
know about Einstein’s socks? Perhaps, especially if they do not continue to pursue graduate
studies in mathematics and become professional mathematicians. Education means that we know
how the world works; training means that we acquire some routine skills without worrying about
their epistemological and ontological nature. (As a graduate student in physics, I complained to
my professors that they were teaching us mere skills, and therefore that university was little
different from vocational school. I said that physics had so many epistemological and ontological
consequences that we should be discussing. But they responded that training us in certain skills
was the purpose of university education.) It therefore also means that we live in a world without
gods. Einstein’s mannerisms concerning his socks is a good way to push a god off the pedestal
and to recognize him as but another human being who has done his part to reproduce and
produce everyday, mundane, immortal society. Einstein wears no socks in the same way that the
emperor does not wear clothes.
Aporia
At the end of his article, Theodore Eisenberg asks the really hard question about what to do with
“the Nazi business of Bieberbach and Teichmüller” and other issues surrounding Nazism, antiSemitism, and the Shoah. Eisenberg states that he “feel[s] uncomfortable in discussing this nasty
business.” It is not my place to lecture him or anyone else how to deal with this problem, which
really is an aporia, a problem without solution, or rather, a problem with contradictory solutions.
(This, especially and because of my German origins, and especially and because my parents were
only children at the time. These contingencies cannot be excuses, which is a very biblical theme,
as we know from the concept of “original sin.”) The solution has to be as aporetic as the
problem. Let me explain.
In making a decision about whether to include historical facts in the teaching of mathematics, as
well as in decisions about whether to include the work of anti-Semitic (pro-Nazi, pro-Serbian
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nationalist, anti-American) scholars within the community of mathematicians (scientists, artists,
culture generally), we must not forget the concept of forgiveness. Here I do not mean the simple
concept of forgiveness—can I forgive this person, can I not forgive that person—but rather the
advanced concept of forgiveness in all its complexity (Derrida, 2005). Derrida points out that we
can only and truly forgive the unforgivable, because if we forgive the forgivable, we have not
really done anything particular. A computer can forgive the forgivable using an algorithm. And,
as the title Pardonner: L’Impardonnable et L’Inprescriptible (To Pardon: On the Unpardonable and
Imprescriptable) suggests, pardon generally and pardoning the unpardonable specifically cannot be
prescribed (which is why it is not my place to lecture anyone on how to deal with the issue). If we
can forgive Bieberbach, Teichmüller and the likes, forgiveness becomes mechanical or a matter
of exchange. If we do not forgive the unforgivable, then we do not make a decision and simply
submit to the condition. Forgiving the unforgivable, however, is the most difficult task we face.
To make his point, Derrida discusses the case of the Russian-born philosopher Vladimir
Jankélévitch (his family emigrated because of the pogroms against Jews), who, in a little book
entitled Le Pardon (The Pardon), had suggested that pardoning a sin is the greatest challenge to
judicial logic. Jankélévitch took a hard-line stance and suggested, in L’Imprescriptible, that the
Shoah (Holocaust) attained such inexpiable singularity that renders impossible any form of
pardon. Derrida also analyzes poem “Todtnauberg,” written by the German- and Frenchspeaking poet Paul Celan (born into a Jewish family in Romania) after his visit of Heidegger at his
home in Todtnauberg, a poem in which he points to (in his usual oblique style) what he had
hoped to hear so much:
...
die in dies Buch
geschriebe Zeile von
einer Hoffnung, heute,
auf eines Denkenden
kommendes
Wort
im Herzen,
...

...
the in this book
written line of
a hope, today,
for a thinker’s
coming
word
in the hear
...

But his host (Heidegger) did not pronounce it: the request to be pardoned for his allegiance to
the Nazi regime. Derrida takes up the complete opposition Jankélévitch showed with respect to
any forgiveness of the Nazi crimes and shows that a solution to this problem dignified to be
named such has to remain aporetic and contradictory. Derrida suggests that the pardon has to be
asked for, to be just, for the fact to be just, and because the one asking is just, and, because to be
just one has to be unjust (i.e., asking for forgiveness of the unforgivable). But Oswald
Teichmüller and Ludwig Bieberbach are no more; they cannot in any way ask for forgiveness. Yet
we must be in a position to forgive the unforgivable that they enacted. The upshot is that we may
pardon the unpardonable, forgive the unforgivable; and this, too, can become part of our
teaching (mathematics, science, philosophy, music, art).
Epilogue
I am glad Theodore Eisenberg took up the challenge to address not only the small problems like
Einstein’s socks but also the real hard and unsolvable problem of the Shoah (and similar
atrocities, the genocides in Rwanda and Serbia, etc.). If there were a simple solution, it would not
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be a real problem. I like the internal contradiction the author leaves at the end—feeling
uncomfortable with the “nasty business,” but at the same time, as a step toward forgiving what
remains unforgivable, “teaching the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals whose
mathematics we teach.” I see it as a move toward a better world, hopefully one without atrocities,
one in which people of all races and believes resort to mechanisms other than violence to resolve
their unavoidable differences—whether they are Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, East and
West Germans, North and South Koreans, or the within-Semite differences between Israelis and
Palestinians, now living divided on the two sides of an emerging concrete wall.
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